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TRUST THE PROCESS? RETHINKING
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND THE
PRESIDENT’S EMERGENCY POWERS OVER
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY
JONATHAN W. ELLISON†
ABSTRACT
To protect U.S. user data from foreign threats, presidents have
wielded their emergency power to ban transactions with certain
technology companies. This emergency power, if unchecked, threatens
both the procedural rights of some technology companies and U.S.
constitutional structure.
Concerning procedural rights, this Note evaluates existing
procedural due process jurisprudence to identify the scope of these
protections in the data security context, which remains unexplored in
scholarship and judicial opinions. For guidance, this Note looks to
cases involving counterterrorist financing and national security reviews
of foreign investment, and it concludes that procedural due process
protects many technology companies that collect personally
identifiable information. In particular, due process requires the
government to provide these companies with meaningful notice and an
opportunity to respond before the president wields emergency powers
that slash these companies’ economic interests. These predeprivation
procedural rights significantly safeguard affected companies by giving
them time to respond.
However, due process alone will not prevent the emergency
executive from running roughshod over the Constitution’s system of
checks and balances. This Note argues, as have many commentators,
that Congress should recalibrate the balance: Congress should amend
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IEEPA to include a sunset provision that would limit the duration of
any national emergency until Congress affirmatively votes to extend it
through a fast-track process. Ultimately, procedural due process and
political process must work hand in hand to protect both constitutional
rights and structures.

INTRODUCTION
Technology connects us, but data divide us. Millions of individuals
across the United States express themselves in cyberspace, leaving
their data behind like fingerprints. Their digital dealings offer troves of
information to not only researchers and retailers but also foreign and
domestic intelligence officers and cyberterrorists. The specter of
espionage has galvanized the federal government to act. To protect
U.S. user data from foreign threats, the government has deployed
various regulatory tools, including the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”).1 When presidents declare national
emergencies related to “unusual and extraordinary” threats,2 IEEPA
empowers them to terminate transactions, freeze assets, and otherwise
wage economic warfare to combat those threats.3 However, this
emergency power, if unchecked, threatens the procedural rights of
some technology companies and could overturn the delicate separation
of powers upon which the federal government teeters.
To meet the threats of a digitally connected world, measures under
IEEPA have taken several forms. IEEPA has historically been used to
freeze assets of terrorists and criminals.4 As economic and social

1. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706. Numerous
executive orders have invoked IEEPA to protect U.S. technology infrastructure. See, e.g., Exec.
Order No. 13,694, 3 C.F.R. 297 (2016) (titled “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging
in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities” (emphasis omitted)); Exec. Order No. 13,873,
3 C.F.R. 317, 317 (2020) (banning transactions in order to safeguard “vulnerabilities in
information and communications technology and services”); Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg.
48,637, 48,637–38 (Aug. 6, 2020) (blocking transactions with TikTok in order to secure U.S. user
data). Beyond IEEPA, Congress in 2018 extended the scope of foreign investment review to
transactions that may compromise sensitive U.S. user data. See infra notes 149–51 and
accompanying text.
2. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(b).
3. See id. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (authorizing the president to “investigate, block during the
pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit” any
transaction involving foreign interests or property subject to U.S. jurisdiction). See infra Part I
for a more detailed discussion of IEEPA.
4. See generally CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY, IAN F. FERGUSSON, DIANNE E. RENNACK &
JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY
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interactions have shifted online, the United States has adapted to
monitor the flow of sensitive user data to the nation’s adversaries.5 For
instance, U.S. policymakers worry the Chinese government exploits
China’s commercial relationships to spy on individuals across the
United States.6 To protect U.S. individuals from such data security
threats, the president may pivot from traditional asset freezes to
targeted transaction prohibitions.7 These transaction bans under
IEEPA resemble divestment orders that sometimes follow national
security reviews of foreign investment undertaken by the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”), which
operates under a different legal framework.8 Rather than locking up
assets in the United States, both bans deliberately expel enterprises
from the U.S. economy.
But using IEEPA to restrict technology companies’ economic
presence in the United States may backfire. As a policy matter, asset
freezes and transaction bans could constrict foreign investment.9 As a
constitutional matter, broad concessions of emergency power threaten

ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE (2020) (discussing trends in IEEPA
applications).
5. See Jonathan Wakely & Andrew Indorf, Managing National Security Risk in an Open
Economy: Reforming the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 9 HARV. NAT’L
SEC. J. 1, 4 (2018) (discussing the unprecedented volume of interaction between the United States
and China); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EMERGING TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL
SECURITY
3–4
(2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2018_AEP_
Emerging_Technology_and_National_Security.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GV3-HBAE] (discussing
the influence of emerging technologies on national security).
6. Wakely & Indorf, supra note 5, at 26. According to one report, Chinese firms target and
invest in “early-stage start-up firms that . . . have high growth potential, in order to transfer
leading-edge technologies from new U.S. start-up firms to China.” JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
(CFIUS) 36 (2018).
7. See David R. Allman, Scalpel or Sledgehammer? Blocking Predatory Foreign Investment
with CFIUS or IEEPA, 10 AM. U. NAT’L SEC. L. BRIEF 267, 331–33 (2020) (distinguishing
between asset-freezing and transaction-banning sanctions under IEEPA).
8. See infra Part II.B. For an overview of the framework governing national security review
of foreign investment, see generally JACKSON, supra note 6.
9. See R. Colgate Selden, The Executive Protection: Freezing the Financial Assets of Alleged
Terrorists, the Constitution, and Foreign Participation in U.S. Financial Markets, 8 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 511 (2003) (“The efficient free flow of investment within U.S. markets will
be difficult to maintain if the government’s latitude to freeze assets is not balanced by increased
consideration of the constitutionality of such actions.”). In 2017, about $7.8 trillion worth of
foreign direct investment flowed into the United States. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 3.
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the institutional balance of power and individual rights.10 Courts have
proven reluctant to question the allocation of emergency powers
between Congress and the president.11 Targeted technology companies
may instead seek refuge in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.12
The Fifth Amendment mandates, “No person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”13
When the president freezes assets or prohibits transactions with a
company, the president deprives that entity of its property rights by
effectively shuttering its business.14 In such situations, the Due Process
Clause requires the government to provide the company with notice
and the opportunity to respond “at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.”15 The dictates of due process depend on the
nature of the threat and the executive’s response.16 Presidents have
deployed IEEPA differently to respond to a broad array of threats,

10. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA.
L. REV. 699, 705 (2006) (arguing emergency powers undermine the rule of law). See generally
BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010) (discussing
institutional dynamics that have aggrandized the presidency); OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ
AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2006)
(describing various models of emergency regimes in democratic societies).
11. See infra Part I.C.
12. See infra Part II.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14. See Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 316 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(holding the company’s “state-law property rights fully vested upon the completion of the
transaction, meaning due process protections necessarily attached”); Al Haramain Islamic Found.
v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 979–80 (9th Cir. 2012) (“By design, a [terrorist
designation] completely shutters all domestic operations of an entity. All assets are frozen. No
person or organization may conduct any business whatsoever with the entity . . . .”); KindHearts
for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 904 (N.D. Ohio 2009)
(describing an asset freeze that indefinitely shut down an organization and jeopardized its
corporate existence). However, the Supreme Court held contingent interests do not sustain Fifth
Amendment claims. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 672–74 (1981) (concluding the
attachment of Iranian property did not support a Fifth Amendment takings claim because
regulations explicitly stated such attachments were void unless licensed and such licenses could
be revoked). The court in Ralls distinguished contingent attachments from fully vested state
property rights and explained the federal government cannot evade the Due Process Clause by
simply announcing the possibility of future property deprivations. Ralls, 758 F.3d at 316. To hold
otherwise would neuter due process rights.
15. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 348 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
16. See infra Part II.
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from entities funding terrorist activities to Chinese-owned technology
companies, thereby triggering distinct due process obligations.
TikTok provides a recent example. TikTok is a social media
platform, on which users create and share short videos augmented with
editing tools.17 TikTok deploys a proprietary algorithm to cater content
to individual user preferences, making the app wildly popular and
addicting.18 In June 2020, the app served 91,937,040 monthly active
users in the United States.19 TikTok is incorporated and headquartered
in the United States, but it is owned by ByteDance Ltd., a Chinese
company.20 In an August 6, 2020, executive order, President Donald
Trump prospectively banned TikTok from the United States.21 Relying
on IEEPA and citing data security concerns, the executive order
prohibited “any transaction by any person, or with respect to any
property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” with
ByteDance or any of its subsidiaries.22 After a few weeks, TikTok sued
the U.S. government, arguing the ban was unlawful and
unconstitutional.23 Among its many claims, TikTok asserted the
government violated its procedural due process rights.24 Particularly,
the company complained that the transaction ban de facto shut down
its application, depriving TikTok of its property.25 Before the August 6
order, TikTok alleged, the government provided neither notice nor an
opportunity to respond.26 The Biden administration paused the
litigation in February 2021 when it filed unopposed motions to hold
ongoing appeals in abeyance as the administration pondered the future

17. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 7, TikTok Inc. v. Trump, 490 F. Supp.
3d 73 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2020) (No. 20-cv-2658), 2020 WL 5628983 [hereinafter TikTok
Complaint]; Our Mission, TIKTOK, https://www.tiktok.com/about? [https://perma.cc/NV2RRH5F].
18. Louise Matsakis, TikTok Finally Explains How the ‘For You’ Algorithm Works, WIRED
(June 18, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/tiktok-finally-explains-for-you-algorithmworks [https://perma.cc/XA9B-VTG2].
19. TikTok Complaint, supra note 17, at 8.
20. Id. at 6; Nicolas Chu, What You Should Know About ByteDance, the Company Behind
TikTok, LINKEDIN (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/what-you-should-knowbytedance-company-behind-tiktok-nicolas-chu [https://perma.cc/L9X2-6BB5].
21. Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637, 48,637–38 (Aug. 6, 2020).
22. Id.
23. TikTok Complaint, supra note 17, at 4–5.
24. Id. at 4.
25. Id. at 36.
26. Id.
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of the prior president’s restrictions.27 In June 2021, President Joe Biden
revoked President Trump’s order and replaced it with a broader
framework for reviewing foreign-owned applications for national
security concerns.28 This evolving controversy illustrates longstanding
questions about the relationship between emergency powers and
procedural rights in a new context—the digital economy.
This Note wades into these unexplored digital depths by applying
existing due process jurisprudence—as developed in the contexts of
counterterrorist financing and national security reviews of foreign
investment—to the relatively untouched data security domain. This
Note argues that procedural due process29 protects many technology
companies that collect personally identifiable information. In
particular, due process requires the government to provide these
companies with meaningful notice and an opportunity to respond
before the president wields emergency powers that eliminate these
companies’ economic interests.30 This notice must include at least the
government’s unclassified reasons for acting.31 These predeprivation
procedural rights significantly safeguard affected companies by giving
them time to respond, but due process will not prevent the emergency
executive from running roughshod over the Constitution’s system of
checks and balances.32 To recalibrate this balance, Congress should
amend IEEPA to include a sunset provision that would limit the
duration of any national emergency until Congress affirmatively votes
to extend it through a fast-track process.33
Part I introduces IEEPA, its implementation, and its record in the
courts. Turning to due process, Part II assesses what and when process
is due in the new context of data security, guided by the existing case

27. Joint Status Report at 1–2, TikTok Inc. v. Biden, No. 20-cv-2658 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2021).
28. Paul Ziobro, Biden Seeks Review of Foreign-Owned Apps Beyond TikTok, WeChat.
Here’s What You Need to Know., WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2021, 4:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/biden-seeks-review-of-foreign-owned-apps-beyond-tiktok-wechat-heres-what-you-needto-know-11623356392 [https://perma.cc/C2ZZ-6ZYT]. Instead of singling out TikTok, President
Biden’s executive order tasked executive officials with assessing threats arising from selling,
transferring, or accessing U.S. individuals’ “sensitive data” or from accessing “large data
repositories by persons owned or controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of, a
foreign adversary.” Exec. Order No. 14,034, 86 Fed. Reg. 31,423, 31,424 (June 9, 2021).
29. To clarify, this Note focuses on procedural due process rather than substantive due
process. Throughout this Note, “due process” refers to procedural due process.
30. See infra Part II.C.
31. See infra Part II.C.
32. See infra Part III.B.
33. See infra Part IV.
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law in the counterterrorist financing and foreign investment settings.
Part III acknowledges both threshold and remedial limitations of these
procedural rights, but it concludes that these rights meaningfully
protect technology companies that hold U.S. individuals’ data.
Recognizing that procedural rights will not sufficiently maintain
constitutional structure, Part IV endorses an existing legislative
proposal that would curb executive emergency power by adding a
sunset provision to IEEPA.
Political checks must meet procedural safeguards to circumscribe
the president’s emergency economic powers and protect individuals
and enterprises from potential executive overreach. To be clear, this
Note does not purport to judge the tactical or strategic wisdom of
targeting one entity or another. Instead, it argues that when the
executive branch acts to isolate certain companies from the U.S.
economy, it must honor these enterprises’ procedural rights.
I. FRAMEWORK OF IEEPA
IEEPA delegates power to the president to control economic
transactions during emergencies. To invoke IEEPA, the president
must find the existence of an “unusual and extraordinary threat, which
has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to
the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States.”34 Next, the president must formally declare a national
emergency in accordance with the National Emergencies Act
(“NEA”).35 Once invoked, IEEPA authorizes the president to “nullify,
void, prevent or prohibit” any transaction involving foreign interests or
property subject to U.S. jurisdiction.36 Though Congress intended

34. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
35. Id. § 1701(b); see H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 2 (1977) (describing presidential authority
conferred by IEEPA as “subject to various procedural limitations, including those of the National
Emergencies Act”).
36. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress
enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (“USA PATRIOT Act”). USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. The USA PATRIOT Act expanded IEEPA. First, it permits
the president to act “during the pendency of an investigation.” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). Second,
it authorizes courts to review classified information ex parte and in camera, thereby allowing the
government to present classified evidence to the court without disclosure to the targeted party or
its attorney. Id. § 1702(c); Nicole Nice-Petersen, Note, Justice for the “Designated”: The Process
That Is Due to Alleged U.S. Financiers of Terrorism, 93 GEO. L.J. 1387, 1390 (2005). Thus, the
USA PATRIOT Act amendments authorize the executive to freeze an entity’s assets before
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IEEPA to rein in presidential emergency powers, the statute’s limits
have withered. Over time, national emergencies have increased in
scope, frequency, and duration.37 Meanwhile, the courts have deferred
to the president.38 This Part tracks the development of IEEPA: its
enactment by Congress, its subsequent execution, and its
interpretation by the federal judiciary.
A. Enacting IEEPA
Congress enacted IEEPA in the second half of the twentieth
century to curb presidential emergency powers, but its limits have
decayed. IEEPA’s predecessor statute, the Trading with the Enemy
Act (“TWEA”),39 was enacted during World War I and enabled the
president to regulate U.S. transactions with foreign nations during
congressionally declared wars.40 As the country battled the Great
Depression, Congress expanded TWEA to reach domestic transactions
and applied it to national emergencies in peacetime.41 Presidents flexed
their newfound power, blurring the purported line between economics
and national security.42 One congressman remarked TWEA all but
conferred “dictatorial powers that [the president] could have used

concluding the target transgressed and permit the government to rely on “secret evidence” never
disclosed to the party against which it is used. Nice-Petersen, supra.
37. CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 17–23; see David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency:
Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2588 (2003)
(“[E]mergency powers have a way of surviving long after the emergency has passed, and
emergencies themselves may last decades.”).
38. See infra Part I.C.
39. Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411 (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4341).
40. Revision of Trading with the Enemy Act: Markup Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations,
95th Cong. 8 (1977) [hereinafter TWEA Markup] (statement of Hon. Jonathan B. Bingham,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Int’l Econ. Pol’y and Trade).
41. Id. (discussing the expansion of TWEA and describing it as a “grab-bag of authorities
which Presidents have been able to use to do virtually anything for which they could find no
specific authority”).
42. For example, President Franklin Roosevelt utilized TWEA to institute a banking
holiday. Harold Hongju Koh & John Choon Yoo, Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense: The Fabric
of Economics and National Security Law, 26 INT’L LAW. 715, 743 (1992). Under TWEA, President
Harry Truman seized property to fuel the Korean war effort. See id. (describing Truman’s seizing
of property and commodities during the Korean war). President Richard Nixon wielded TWEA
to regulate U.S. monetary reserves and to maintain trade balances, finding that “our trade and
international competitive position is seriously threatened and, as a result, our continued ability to
assure our security could be impaired.” Id. (quoting Proclamation No. 4074, 85 Stat. 926 (1971)).
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without any restraint by the Congress.”43 Eventually, the Vietnam War
and Watergate galvanized Congress to act.44 First, in 1976, Congress
enacted NEA,45 which prescribed new limits and procedures for
declaring national emergencies.46 Next, Congress limited TWEA to
apply only in wartime.47 Finally, Congress passed IEEPA in 1977 to
govern peacetime emergency powers.48 IEEPA primarily imposed two
limits. Both have weakened.
First, IEEPA, as initially enacted, empowered Congress to
terminate any declared national emergency—the precondition of
IEEPA action—by passing a concurrent resolution.49 This provision
lost its bite, however, when the Supreme Court invalidated such
legislative vetoes in INS v. Chadha.50 Consequently, Congress may only
terminate a national emergency by joint, not concurrent, resolution.51

43. TWEA Markup, supra note 40, at 5 (statement of Hon. Jonathan B. Bingham).
44. CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 6; Koh & Yoo, supra note 42, at 743 (“In the wake of
Watergate and Vietnam Congress moved in the mid-1970s to control executive abuse of the
TWEA.”).
45. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651).
46. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 8 (describing key NEA provisions).
47. See Amendments to the Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. I, 91 Stat.
1625, 1625 (1977) (“Section 5(b)(1) of the Trading With the Enemy Act is amended by striking
out ‘or during any other period of national emergency declared by the President’ in the text
preceding subparagraph (A).”); H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 2 (1977).
48. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. II, 91 Stat. 1625,
1626 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706); CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 9.
49. CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 46.
50. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958–59, 958 n.23 (1983) (invalidating legislative
provisions that do not follow the Article I process, including presentment to the president).
Legislative vetoes are congressional oversight mechanisms—such as one-house or two-house
vetoes—that enable Congress to respond to executive actions without running the gauntlet of the
full legislative process, which requires Congress to submit the potential legislation to the president
for their signature or veto. LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22132, LEGISLATIVE VETOES
AFTER CHADHA 1 (2005). In Chadha, the Court held Congress must follow the legislative process,
subject to both bicameralism and presentment requirements, when Congress acts with “the
purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons,
including . . . Executive Branch officials.” Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952. Both joint and concurrent
resolutions require approval from both houses, satisfying the bicameralism requirement. Types of
Legislation, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/leg_laws_acts.htm
[https://perma.cc/6JGC-X58P]. Unlike concurrent resolutions, however, joint resolutions require
the president’s signature to become law. Id. Therefore, joint resolutions are not unconstitutional
legislative vetoes.
51. BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE
HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME 204–05 (1988); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1080 (2004).
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Because the president can veto joint resolutions, Congress now must
cobble together a two-thirds majority in both houses to terminate a
national emergency in the face of presidential resistance.52 In divisive
times, this task is herculean at best and impossible in practice.
Second, together with NEA, IEEPA contemplates consulting and
reporting requirements. IEEPA requires the president to consult with
Congress before acting under IEEPA “in every possible instance.”53
After acting, the president must periodically report to Congress.54
However, “the statute’s weak consultation and reporting procedures
have been largely diluted or ignored.”55 Meanwhile, NEA requires
Congress to meet every six months to consider whether to terminate
any existing emergencies.56 NEA further requires the president to
renew any declared national emergencies each year to prevent them
from lapsing.57 But the statute does not limit renewals. Presidents have
nominally complied with procedural and reporting requirements by
submitting pro forma reports every six months, but Congress has never
attempted to terminate a national emergency declared pursuant to
NEA to authorize action under IEEPA.58 When push comes to shove,
Congress cannot muster the political will to check the president.59 As
meaningful checks on emergency executive power have disintegrated,60
the president has obtained through IEEPA free rein to prohibit
transactions and freeze assets.

52. CARTER, supra note 51, at 205; Ackerman, supra note 51, at 1080.
53. 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a).
54. Id. § 1703(b)–(c).
55. Ackerman, supra note 51, at 1079; see also Barry E. Carter, International Economic
Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1234–35 (1987)
(“In practice, however, [consulting and reporting requirements] create few roadblocks to
presidential action.”).
56. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b).
57. Id. § 1622(d).
58. CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 44; see also Koh & Yoo, supra note 42, at 745 (“Although
the executive has perfunctorily reported on the status of emergencies, Congress has neither
reviewed nor considered terminating them.”).
59. See Koh & Yoo, supra note 42, at 744 (“Presidents have regularly sidestepped
congressional restrictions, gaining access to IEEPA’s broad grants of authority with almost no
congressional opposition.”); see also supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
60. See Koh & Yoo, supra note 42, at 746–47; Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President
(Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255,
1258 (1988) (discussing “executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance”
in foreign affairs).
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B. Executing IEEPA
As threats proliferate, the president’s emergency powers
propagate. IEEPA’s drafters hoped to circumscribe these powers,
saving them for “rare and brief” emergencies.61 Over IEEPA’s
lifespan, however, presidentially declared national emergencies have
increased in scope, frequency, and duration.62 As of July 2020,
presidents had declared sixty-seven emergencies under NEA.63 Fiftynine of them invoked IEEPA, and thirty-three of these remained in
effect as of that date.64 On average, emergencies have retained their
“declared” status for about a decade.65 Some emergencies have
remained “declared” considerably longer. For instance, the first
national emergency invoking IEEPA, declared by President Jimmy
Carter during the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis, remains in effect as of
this writing.66
Ever since, the United States has come to rely heavily on
economic emergency powers and IEEPA in order to further various
policy objectives from combatting nuclear proliferation to countering
terrorism, cybercrime to election interference.67 Initially, many
executive orders under IEEPA were limited to a particular country or
government, but presidents have pivoted from targeting state actors to
61. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 10–11 (1977) (“[E]mergencies are by their nature rare and
brief, and are not to be equated with normal, ongoing problems. . . . A state of national emergency
should not be a normal state of affairs.”).
62. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 17–23 (discussing broadening emergency
declarations); Cole, supra note 37, at 2588 (“[E]mergency powers have a way of surviving long
after the emergency has passed, and emergencies themselves may last decades.”); see also
Ackerman, supra note 51, at 1030 (“Unless careful precautions are taken, emergency measures
have a habit of continuing well beyond their time of necessity. Governments should not be
permitted to run wild even during the emergency . . . .”).
63. CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 17–18.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 17.
66. Id. at 18–19.
67. See Kathy Gilsinan, A Boom Time for U.S. Sanctions, ATLANTIC (May 3, 2019), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/05/why-united-states-uses-sanctions-so-much/588625
[https://perma.cc/3ZU3-RXW9] (describing increasing sanctions use by the United States). See
generally JUAN ZARATE, TREASURY’S WAR: THE UNLEASHING OF A NEW ERA OF FINANCIAL
WARFARE (2013) (discussing the United States’ development and use of economic strategies to
combat its adversaries). The current U.S. sanctions regime primarily rests on IEEPA. Elena
Chachko, Administrative National Security, 108 GEO. L.J. 1063, 1094 (2020); Jonathan Masters,
What Are Economic Sanctions?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS., https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/what-are-economic-sanctions [https://perma.cc/3YQD-JQ96] (last updated Aug.
12, 2019).
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declaring broader emergencies stemming from transnational threats.68
In recent years, President Barack Obama declared an emergency in
view of “[p]ersons [e]ngaging in [s]ignificant [m]alicious [c]yber[e]nabled [a]ctivities.”69 He then blocked their “property” subject to
U.S. jurisdiction by prohibiting it from being “transferred, paid,
exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in.”70 President Trump
declared an emergency arising from “foreign adversaries . . . creating
and exploiting vulnerabilities in information and communications
technology and services.”71 He then prohibited the “acquisition,
importation, transfer, installation, dealing in, or use” of certain
information and communications technology or services flagged by the
Secretary of Commerce.72 As presidents continue to wield IEEPA,
wide-ranging emergencies have come to pervade U.S. politics
“unchecked, unreviewed, and perfunctorily reported.”73 This
expansion of executive power has met little resistance from federal
courts.
C. Interpreting IEEPA
The judiciary has deferred to the president and expansively
interpreted IEEPA.74 Courts often yield to the executive branch on

68. Chachko, supra note 67, at 1094–95; see also Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario:
Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 13–14 (2005)
(noting President Bill Clinton “broke new ground under IEEPA by ordering sanctions targeting
not a state and its citizens but, instead, terrorist organizations and their members”). As Professor
James Savage explains, IEEPA was originally “used against nations and national corporations,”
but “[n]ow our national interests have necessitated that the IEEPA evolve further, so that it can
be used to block transactions, freeze and seize assets of terrorists who are basically stateless and
can move with relative freedom around the globe.” James J. Savage, Executive Use of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act – Evolution Through the Terrorist and Taliban
Sanctions, 10 CURRENTS 28, 37 (2001).
69. Exec. Order No. 13,694, 3 C.F.R. 297 (2016) (emphasis omitted).
70. Id.
71. Exec. Order No. 13,873, 3 C.F.R. 317, 317 (2020).
72. Id.
73. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1416
(1989).
74. See, e.g., Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(“[O]ur review—in an area at the intersection of national security, foreign policy, and
administrative law—is extremely deferential.”); Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C.
2012) (“Courts are particularly mindful that their review is highly deferential when matters of
foreign policy and national security are concerned.” (citing Islamic Am. Relief Agency, 477 F.3d
at 734)); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 84 (D.D.C. 2002)
(“Blocking orders are an important component of U.S. foreign policy, and the President’s choice
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matters of foreign affairs and national security, which require the
executive’s expertise, secrecy, and political accountability.75 Executive
emergency power has been a creature of statute since Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.76 Justice Robert H. Jackson, in his iconic
concurrence,77 distinguished among three categories of presidential
power. In the first category, the president acts with express or implied
congressional authorization; when backed by a statute, presidential
action is “supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest
latitude of judicial interpretation.”78 In contrast, when the president
acts contrary to the will of Congress, “his power is at its lowest ebb.”79
In between lies Justice Jackson’s “zone of twilight,” where Congress
has neither authorized nor prohibited presidential action.80 Judicial
deference fluctuates based on the interplay of the political branches, so
broad statutes make for broad executive power.
As the Court made clear in Dames & Moore v. Regan,81 IEEPA is
a broad statute. In Regan, President Carter, relying on IEEPA,
nullified judicial attachments and suspended private claims against
Iran as part of an accord to end the Iranian hostage crisis.82 The Court
held IEEPA implicitly authorized the president’s measures, noting that
“Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible

of this tool to combat terrorism is entitled to particular deference.”), aff’d, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“The
nature of transactions with foreign nations, moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and
their success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 24-406, at 24
(1836))); see also Chachko, supra note 67, at 1136 (summarizing the “conventional wisdom” that
courts lack the institutional capacity to decide matters of national security).
76. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction
or conjunction with those of Congress.”).
77. Jackson’s concurrence has, over time, eclipsed the majority’s opinion. See, e.g., Louis
Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 94 (2d ed. 1996) (labeling
Jackson’s opinion “a starting point for constitutional discussion of concurrent powers”); Curtis
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV.
1201, 1257 (2018) (characterizing Jackson’s framework as “canonical”); Daryl J. Levinson &
Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2314 (2006)
(describing Jackson’s concurrence as “the most celebrated judicial opinion of the separation-ofpowers canon”).
78. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636–37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 637.
80. Id.
81. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
82. Id. at 660.
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action the President may find [necessary].”83 According to the Court,
Congress intended to broaden presidential emergency powers when it
passed IEEPA.84 As previously discussed, the statute’s legislative
history muddies this conclusion.85 Nevertheless, structural challenges
in IEEPA cases typically fail due to judicial deference.86
In particular, the political question doctrine has allowed judges to
avoid hearing these cases. Theoretically, the political question doctrine
preserves the separation of powers by excluding policy-driven
controversies from judicial review.87 The doctrine bars courts from
hearing claims that the Constitution assigns to a different branch or
that lack “judicially discoverable and manageable standards.”88
National security cases raise quintessential political questions,89 and
courts will not second guess the president’s decision to declare or
continue a national emergency.90 However, some cases touching upon
national security or foreign relations may not lie “beyond judicial
cognizance.”91
The political question pumpkin transforms into a justiciable
carriage once the president wields emergency powers to the detriment
of individual rights.92 As Part II discusses, courts have repeatedly

83. Id. at 678.
84. See id. at 678–79 (basing its divination of Congress’s intent on Congress’s practical
constraints and “a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the
President”).
85. See supra Part I.A.
86. See CarrieLyn Donigan Guymon, The Best Tool for the Job: The U.S. Campaign To
Freeze Assets of Proliferators and Their Supporters, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 849, 861 (2009) (“U.S.
courts typically decline to question the executive’s invocation of IEEPA . . . .”); Koh, supra note
60, at 1305–17 (discussing judicial deference to the executive in matters of foreign affairs, through
both affirmative rulings on the merits and refusal to hear a challenges on justiciability grounds).
87. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 840 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (describing the political question doctrine as an outgrowth of the separation of powers).
88. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
89. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) (“Matters intimately related to foreign policy
and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.”).
90. See United States v. Spawr Optical Rsch., Inc., 685 F.2d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1982)
(characterizing declaration and continuation of national emergencies as “essentially political
questions” (quoting United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 579 (C.C.P.A. 1975)));
Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191, 1194–95 (D. Mass. 1986) (holding whether an
emergency was properly declared is a political question), aff’d, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987).
91. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211).
92. See Chachko, supra note 67, at 1136 (“Once individuals are directly affected, the issues
before courts transform from abstract policy problems . . . to narrowly tailored questions of
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adjudicated procedural due process disputes arising from executive
action pursuant to IEEPA or other transaction-blocking authorities.
For instance, in the foreign investment context, the D.C. Circuit has
explicitly held a due process challenge to a presidential divestment
order does not pose a political question.93 The court explained that a
due process claim neither challenges the president’s determination as
to what constitutes a national threat nor attacks the president’s
selected response.94 Instead, a due process challenge fits squarely
within the judicial role: interpreting the Constitution.95 The judiciary
may intercede when the political branches threaten individual
constitutional rights, such as the procedural due process rights to
meaningful notice and the opportunity to respond.96 But, for pure
structural threats, the judiciary has been reluctant to restrain
presidential emergency powers.
In sum, separation of powers jurisprudence does little to rein in
the emergency executive. As interpreted, IEEPA broadly empowers
the president, so challenges to presidential authority will continue to
fail as Congress and the courts pass the buck back and forth. Cast under
IEEPA’s long shadow, presidential transaction bans are unlikely ultra
vires, but the president still cannot wield emergency powers to subvert
constitutional rights. External limits, such as procedural due process,
provide more meaningful constraints on executive power and sound
bases for judicial review.

administrative law and procedural due process—the type of questions that courts decide
regularly.”); Alexander F. Cohen & Joseph Ravitch, Comment, Economic Sanctions, Domestic
Deprivations, and the Just Compensation Clause: Enforcing the Fifth Amendment in the Foreign
Affairs Context, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 146, 148 (1988) (“To succeed against economic sanctions in
federal court, a litigant must rely on the Bill of Rights, demonstrating that some aspect of the
program violates a right guaranteed by the Constitution.”).
93. See Ralls, 758 F.3d at 314 (“We think it clear, then, that Ralls’s due process claim does
not encroach on the prerogative of the political branches, does not require the exercise of nonjudicial discretion and is susceptible to judicially manageable standards.”).
94. Id.
95. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34–35 (1982) (clarifying courts may assess whether
procedures “meet the essential standard of fairness under the Due Process Clause,” even
regarding issues “largely within the control of the Executive and the Legislature”). Similarly, the
Supreme Court has held the political question doctrine does not bar a takings claim ensuing from
an economic sanctions program. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230
(1986).
96. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 348 (1976) (confirming that due process
requires the government to offer notice and the opportunity to respond “at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))).
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II. DICTATES OF DUE PROCESS
At its core, due process entails two essential components: notice
and the opportunity to respond “at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.”97 To respond meaningfully, the aggrieved party
must have access to the factual and legal bases for the government’s
action.98 But limits exist. When acting pursuant to IEEPA, the
executive branch need not provide procedures equivalent to a fullblown judicial trial.99 The Ninth Circuit has clarified: “[T]he
Constitution certainly does not require that the government take
actions that would endanger national security . . . . But the
Constitution does require that the government take reasonable
measures to enforce basic fairness . . . .”100 Reasonableness is
situational.101
In Mathews v. Eldridge,102 the Supreme Court laid out a flexible
balancing test to determine the process due in a given context.103 Courts
must consider: (1) the private interest affected by government action;
(2) the risk of “erroneous deprivation” of this interest through the
procedures used and the probable value of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the
extent to which additional process would burden the government.104
The weight attributed to these factors depends on context.
As for timing, due process generally requires the government to
provide “notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before
97. Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552).
98. Ralls, 758 F.3d at 318 (“Both the Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that the
right to know the factual basis for the action and the opportunity to rebut the evidence supporting
that action are essential components of due process.” (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,
496 (1959))).
99. For instance, the D.C. Circuit determined that a designated charity had no due process
right to cross-examine witnesses. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156,
164 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
100. Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 980 (9th Cir. 2012)
(emphasis added).
101. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” (quoting Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972))). Due process requires notice “reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314 (1950).
102. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
103. Id. at 334–35.
104. Id.
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depriving a person of certain property interests.”105 In “extraordinary”
situations, however, postdeprivation process suffices.106 Under the
Supreme Court’s test in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,107
to demonstrate an “extraordinary” situation, the government must
show: (1) “an important governmental interest” required the
deprivation; (2) there was “a special need for very prompt action”; and
(3) a government official initiated the deprivation acting “under the
standards of a narrowly drawn statute.”108 As with the extent of due
process, timing depends on the situation’s particular circumstances.
Because courts have developed a situational due process
jurisprudence, the extent and timing of the process due depend on the
nature of the threat and the executive response. As such, due process
requires distinct procedures for entities that fund terrorism and
businesses that gather U.S. consumers’ data even though both
frameworks predominantly rest on IEEPA. Courts have largely
developed due process requirements in the former context, but they
have not yet determined what process is due when the president
employs IEEPA to blacklist entities posing information-based national
security threats. Instead, the due process rights of such technology
companies may mimic those protecting foreign investors subject to
presidential divestment orders, which arise under different legal
authority but raise similar policy choices. Accordingly, this Part looks
to the existing cases under IEEPA’s terrorist designation scheme and
those involving foreign investment, analogizing these cases to the data
security context.
In assessing the scope of procedural due process in these varying
contexts, this Part analyzes two interlinking questions: First, what
processes are required by the Fifth Amendment? Second, must the
government make these processes available to the private target before
or after the property deprivation? As to the former question, the
105. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 76 (D.D.C. 2002)
(emphasis added) (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993)),
aff’d, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
106. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 678–80 (1974).
107. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
108. Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. at 76 (citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678). In full, the third
requirement mandates “the party initiating the deprivation was a government official responsible
for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and
justified in the particular instance.” Id. This language focuses on the decisionmaker rather than
the substantive decision. After all, courts hesitate to second guess the policy merits of executive
officials’ national security decisions. See supra Part I.C.
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government must at least provide an adequate statement of reasons for
its action based on the unclassified record, and it must offer the
targeted entity an opportunity to respond. As to the latter, technology
companies blacklisted for data security reasons are entitled to
predeprivation process.
A. Counterterrorist Financing
The U.S. counterterrorist financing regime relies largely on
IEEPA.109 On September 23, 2001, less than two weeks after the
September 11 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush declared a
national emergency with respect to global terrorism, invoking IEEPA,
and authorized the Treasury Department to block “all property and
interests in property” of entities or individuals designated as Specially
Designated Global Terrorists (“SDGTs”).110 The emergency remains
in effect,111 and, by one estimate, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control (“OFAC”) had designated 6,763 such persons as of
November 2018.112 As discussed in this Section, some designated
groups and individuals have challenged their designations, providing
rich case law on the extent and timing of procedural due process rights
when the executive branch wields IEEPA.
1. “What”: Extent of Process. When the executive branch relies on
IEEPA to blacklist terrorist organizations, due process requires the
government to provide at least the unclassified factual basis for its
action. Courts have sought to balance procedural rights and national
security concerns. In Al Haramain Islamic Foundation v. U.S.
Department of Treasury,113 the scales tipped in favor of procedural
rights.114

109. Chachko, supra note 67, at 1094.
110. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. 786, 787 (2002); Laura K. Donohue, Constitutional and
Legal Challenges to the Anti-Terrorist Finance Regime, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 650–51
(2008).
111. CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 49.
112. Chachko, supra note 67, at 1095.
113. Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2012).
114. See id. at 988 (“We hold that OFAC violated [Al Haramain’s] due process rights by
failing to provide an adequate statement of reasons for its investigation.”); see also KindHearts
for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 864–67, 904–06 (N.D.
Ohio 2009) (holding OFAC failed to provide adequate notice to a nonprofit after OFAC
neglected to provide a copy of the administrative record to the nonprofit’s attorney).
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In Al Haramain, a Ninth Circuit panel concluded procedural due
process requires OFAC to state adequately the reasons for its
determinations.115 OFAC provisionally blocked Al Haramain’s assets
in February 2004 without explanation.116 When OFAC designated the
foundation as an SDGT seven months later, OFAC publicly
acknowledged only one of its three reasons for designating Al
Haramain.117 Beginning in early 2005, the foundation requested
administrative reconsideration, denying any connection to terrorism,
and “repeatedly sought both an explanation for the designation and a
final
determination
of
its
request
for
administrative
reconsideration.”118 By August 2007, the organization had still received
no response from OFAC, so it sued.119
Applying Mathews, the panel held OFAC failed to provide
adequate notice.120 Under the first factor—the private interest affected
by government action—the foundation’s interest was substantial
because OFAC prevented the foundation from using “any funds
whatsoever, for any purpose,” effectively shuttering its business.121 In
other words, “designation is not a mere inconvenience or burden on
certain property interests; designation indefinitely renders a domestic
organization financially defunct.”122 The second factor—risk of
erroneous deprivation—also proved significant because the foundation
could only guess at OFAC’s reasons for acting.123 The third Mathews
factor—the government’s interest and burden of providing additional
procedural safeguards—also favored the foundation because OFAC
115. Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 988.
116. Id. at 973, 985.
117. Id. at 973–74, 986. In September 2004, OFAC issued a press release stating that it had
designated the foundation. Id. at 973–74. The court rejected OFAC’s argument that this press
release amounted to sufficient notice. Id. at 986. According to the court, “the press release states
with some clarity that [the foundation] supported Chechen terrorists,” but it did not apprise the
foundation of OFAC’s concern regarding two individuals’ control of the foundation. Id. The court
concluded, “OFAC provided notice concerning only one of three reasons for its investigation and
designation, and that notice occurred seven months after it froze [the foundation’s] assets. Such a
significantly untimely and incomplete notice does not meet the requirements of due process.” Id.
118. Id. at 974.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 986 (“Such a significantly untimely and incomplete notice does not meet the
requirements of due process.”).
121. Id. at 985–86.
122. Id. at 980.
123. Id. at 986–87 (“[T]he opportunity to guess at the factual and legal bases for a government
action does not substitute for actual notice of the government’s intentions.”).
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failed to explain to the court why its scant process promoted national
security.124
Al Haramain also addressed the question of secret evidence—that
is, evidence not disclosed to the blacklisted entity.125 The Due Process
Clause typically does not require the government to divulge classified
information.126 The government possesses a legitimate interest in
safeguarding sensitive information, especially when disclosure might
compromise national security, such as by unveiling intelligence sources
or methods.127 As the Seventh Circuit stated, “The Constitution would
indeed be a suicide pact if the only way to curtail enemies’ access to
assets were to reveal information that might cost lives.”128
Nevertheless, the government must reasonably try to mitigate secret
evidence’s unfairness when the potential value to the designated entity
outweighs the burden of mitigation.129 Failure to disclose information,

124. Id. at 986.
125. For a discussion of “secret evidence” and the shortcomings of approaches towards
mitigating its unfairness to parties kept in the dark, see generally David Cole & Stephen I.
Vladeck, Navigating the Shoals of Secrecy: A Comparative Analysis of the Use of Secret Evidence
and ‘Cleared Counsel’ in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, in REASONING
RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT 161 (Liora Lazarus, Christopher McCrudden
& Nigel Bowles eds., 2014).
126. See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(noting due process demands disclosure of “only the unclassified portions of the administrative
record” (quoting People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1242 (D.C.
Cir. 2003))); Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting there is “no automatic
right to access classified evidence”).
127. Nice-Petersen, supra note 36, at 1410.
128. Glob. Relief Found. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
129. Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 982–84. Mitigation procedures must “address the tension
between fundamental fairness and secrecy.” Cole & Vladeck, supra note 125, at 162. Courts have
balanced these concerns through various approaches. For instance, the D.C. Circuit has suggested
that, in certain limited circumstances, the government must provide unclassified summaries of
classified evidence. See Fares v. Smith, 901 F.3d 315, 324 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (countenancing the use
of unclassified summaries when it would not compromise intelligence sources or national
security). Sometimes, however, the government cannot safely declassify or summarize sensitive
information otherwise required to provide constitutionally adequate notice.
Alternatively, another approach permits lawyers, but not their affected clients, to see the
classified evidence. Cole & Vladeck, supra note 125, at 162. Under this approach, the lawyer must
first obtain a security clearance and is prohibited from revealing the classified evidence to their
client. Id. This elaborate strategy was embraced by a federal district judge in KindHearts for
Charitable Humanitarian Development, Inc. v. Geithner. 710 F. Supp. 2d 637, 660 (N.D. Ohio
2010) (proposing a multistep remedial procedure to determine the extent to which secret evidence
could and should be declassified, summarized, or presented to counsel with security clearance).
While creative, the security-cleared-counsel approach will not suffice. Sharing the classified
information with a lawyer with a security clearance does not level the playing field because the
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classified or otherwise, raises the risk of erroneous and unjust
deprivation because it undermines the adversarial process.130 So the use
of secret evidence remains highly suspect under the Mathews balancing
test.131 According to the Ninth Circuit, “Only the most extraordinary
circumstances could support [such] one-sided process.”132 But such
extraordinary circumstances often permeate the national security
space, so the government need not make the information available if it
demonstrates why declassification, or some other mitigation strategy,
would threaten national security.133
Altogether, in the counterterrorist financing context, the
government must at a minimum provide the unclassified record, but it
must also reasonably try to mitigate any reliance on classified evidence.
2. “When”: Timing of Process. As the Ninth Circuit observed in
Al Haramain, many courts have permitted postdeprivation process
when the executive branch wields IEEPA to block terrorist
financing.134 In counterterrorist financing cases, the government must

lawyer cannot discuss the information with their client. See Cole & Vladeck, supra note 125, at
163–66 (explaining the limits imposed on cleared counsel in communicating with their
Guantanamo Bay detainees). Instead of fighting blind, the lawyer must now fight one-handed.
130. See Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995)
(“[T]he very foundation of the adversary process assumes that use of undisclosed information will
violate due process because of the risk of error.”); Nice-Petersen, supra note 36, at 1407 (“When
a blocked entity has been told little or nothing about the kind of evidence the government has
accumulated against it, or what this evidence is specifically alleging, mounting a defense is akin to
shooting in the dark.”).
131. Applying Mathews, a Ninth Circuit panel declared the “use of undisclosed information
in adjudications should be presumptively unconstitutional” and upheld a permanent injunction
barring the use of undisclosed classified information in an alien legalization proceeding. Am.Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 70 F.3d at 1070–71. The panel further provided,
We cannot in good conscience find that the President’s broad generalization regarding
a distant foreign policy concern and a related national security threat suffices to support
a process that is inherently unfair because of the enormous risk of error and the
substantial personal interests involved. “[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is
efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone,
will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.”
Id. at 1070 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)). At least in the immigration context,
courts may scrutinize the government’s reasons for keeping others in the dark.
132. Id.
133. See Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 982–83 (recognizing disclosure will not be possible when it
would implicate national security).
134. See id. at 985 (citing Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 163–
64 (D.C. Cir. 2003)) (allowing the executive branch to forego predeprivation process when
wielding IEEPA to block terrorist financing); see also Glob. Relief Found. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d
748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (determining preseizure hearing was not constitutionally required as it
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act swiftly and decisively to prevent the organization from spiriting
assets beyond the reach of U.S. authorities.135 The Seventh Circuit has
clarified that “[a]lthough pre-seizure hearing is the constitutional
norm, postponement is acceptable in emergencies.”136 The CaleroToledo test helps identify such “extraordinary situations.”137
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia applied this
test in Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Development v. Ashcroft.138
There, OFAC designated a foundation as a terrorist organization and
blocked its assets without providing notice or a hearing beforehand.139
The court determined the first Calero-Toledo requirement—“an
important governmental interest”—was satisfied by the government’s
interest in curtailing terrorist financing.140 As the court observed,
OFAC designated the foundation less than three months after the
September 11, 2001, attacks and President Bush’s ensuing executive
order, which declared a national emergency to combat terrorist
financing.141 The second requirement—“a special need for very prompt
action”—also had been satisfied: “Money is fungible, and any delay or
pre-blocking notice would afford a designated entity the opportunity
to transfer, spend, or conceal its assets, thereby making the IEEPA
sanctions program virtually meaningless.”142 The final Calero-Toledo
requirement—whether the deprivation had been carried out by an

“would allow any enemy to spirit assets out of the United States”); Islamic Am. Relief Agency v.
Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 50 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding the designated entity was
“not entitled to pre-deprivation notice and a hearing”), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Islamic
Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
135. See Al Haramain, 686 F.3d at 985 (“[T]he potential for ‘asset flight’ almost certainly
justifies OFAC’s decision not to provide notice before freezing the assets.”); Glob. Relief, 315
F.3d at 754 (determining a preseizure hearing was not constitutionally required as it “would allow
any enemy to spirit assets out of the United States”); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v.
Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 76–77 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[P]rompt action by the Government was
necessary to protect against the transfer of assets subject to the blocking order.”), aff’d, 333 F.3d
156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
136. Glob. Relief, 315 F.3d at 754.
137. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 678–80 (1974).
138. Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 76–77.
139. Id. at 62, 76.
140. Id. at 76; see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (“[N]o governmental interest is
more compelling than the security of the Nation.”).
141. Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 76–77.
142. Id.
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authorized government entity—gave the court no pause.143 OFAC,
acting pursuant to IEEPA and corresponding executive orders, carried
out the designation and asset freeze.144 Concluding Calero-Toledo’s
three requirements had been satisfied, the district court held OFAC
had not defaulted on due process.145 Without revisiting the CaleroToledo analysis, the D.C. Circuit agreed.146
In sum, when OFAC deploys IEEPA to freeze terrorist assets,
postdeprivation process satisfies the Due Process Clause. This process
requires notice including, at a minimum, the unclassified basis for the
government’s action. The terrorist designation cases inform due
process in other IEEPA contexts, such as data security, yet designated
terrorists differ from data-gathering companies. National security
review of foreign investment—admittedly governed by a different legal
framework—operates in a more similar fashion to data security
matters.
B. Foreign Investment
CFIUS is an executive branch committee that “monitor[s] the
impact of foreign investment in the United States.”147 In general,
CFIUS reviews transactions that might implicate national security,
and, if concerns remain unmitigated, CFIUS may submit a negative
determination to the president, who may then choose to block the
transaction.148 Recent CFIUS trends reveal growing concerns about
foreign, especially Chinese, control of U.S. technology and data.149
Apprehensive about foreign investment in U.S. technology companies,
Congress enacted the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization
Act of 2018 (“FIRRMA”).150 FIRRMA expressly expanded CFIUS’s
purview to transactions that may compromise “sensitive personal data
143. See id. at 77 (“[G]overnment officials, and not private parties, initiated the blocking
action. OFAC did so pursuant to the IEEPA and two Executive Orders that specifically authorize
such action in limited circumstances.”).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 163–64 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
147. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990, 991 (1975).
148. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 22–23.
149. See, e.g., id. at 11 (“During the 115th Congress, many Members expressed concerns over
China’s growing investment in the United States, particularly in the technology sector.”).
150. Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-232, 132
Stat. 2174 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 4565); see JACKSON, supra note 6, at 11 (discussing the
enactment of FIRRMA).
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of United States citizens that may be exploited in a manner that
threatens national security.”151 As of February 2020, only five
transactions had been blocked by presidents through the CFIUS
framework.152 Four involved Chinese companies or nationals.153 The
president’s substantive determination is not subject to judicial review,
but courts can and have reviewed these presidential bans to ensure due
process.154
IEEPA and CFIUS intertwine, but they are not identical. On one
hand, CFIUS divestment orders resemble IEEPA transaction bans
designed to secure data. Each of the frameworks involves economic
powers wielded by the executive to deprive private parties of
property.155 CFIUS review may culminate in a presidential order
nullifying investments, much like an IEEPA order may prohibit
transactions.156 On the other hand, IEEPA-based sanctions flow from
“[p]residentially declared national emergenc[ies],”157 while CFIUS
jurisdiction does not depend on declared emergencies.158
Though salient, this distinction has lost force as checks on the
president’s emergency powers have eroded.159 The ease with which
151. 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(B)(iii)(III).
152. JACKSON, supra note 6, at 23.
153. See id. summary (describing presidentially blocked transactions following CFIUS
review).
154. Id. at 23–24.
155. See generally Allman, supra note 7 (comparing and contrasting presidential action under
CFIUS and IEEPA and arguing CFIUS provides the more appropriate framework for monitoring
foreign investment in the United States).
156. The TikTok controversy illustrates the overlap between IEEPA and CFIUS. On August
6, 2020, President Trump issued an executive order invoking IEEPA to ban all transactions with
TikTok and its Chinese parent company, ByteDance. Robert Chesney, Will TikTok Win Its
Lawsuit Against Trump?, LAWFARE (Aug. 25, 2020, 9:17 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/willtiktok-win-its-lawsuit-against-trump [https://perma.cc/P3ZX-FSE3]. On August 14, 2020,
President Trump ordered ByteDance to divest TikTok from its business. Id. This second order
followed on the heels of a CFIUS review, initiated in June 2020, of ByteDance’s prior acquisition
of the company that it rebranded as TikTok. TikTok Complaint, supra note 17, at 14–17, 22.
157. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 76 (D.D.C. 2002),
aff’d, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Some courts have distinguished the process due under IEEPA
from other asset-freezing statutes on the basis that IEEPA-based sanctions require a
presidentially declared national emergency. E.g., id.; Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified
FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 49 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d on other grounds sub nom., Islamic Am.
Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
158. See JACKSON, supra note 6, at 8 (observing that Congress shaped CFIUS, in part, to
enable the president to conduct “foreign investment policy” without needing to declare first a
national emergency).
159. See supra Part I.
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presidents now declare national emergencies dilutes the meaning of
these so-called emergencies.160 Suppose entities indeed possess weaker
due process rights when the president acts pursuant to IEEPA rather
than a CFIUS review. The president could evade the stronger
protections of the latter by declaring a pro forma emergency.
Constitutional rights ought not turn on such formalist sleights of hand.
Instead, the existing jurisprudence considers context, which invariably
varies across emergencies. Accordingly, like the terrorist designation
cases, CFIUS cases provide helpful data points by which to interpolate
the scope of the process due when the president invokes IEEPA in the
name of data security.
1. “What”: Extent of Process. In the foreign investment setting, as
in the counterterrorist financing context, due process at least requires
access to the unclassified evidence. In Ralls Corp. v. Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States,161 the D.C. Circuit evaluated
whether the president violated the Due Process Clause by ordering
Ralls, a U.S. company owned by Chinese nationals, to divest from a
windfarm project located in Oregon.162 Specifically, Ralls had
purchased four U.S. companies to develop windfarms near a Navy
installation, raising national security concerns.163 After the deal had
been completed, CFIUS reviewed the transaction and concluded that
it threatened national security.164 CFIUS referred the matter to the
president, who agreed and ordered Ralls to divest.165 Both CFIUS and
the president failed to give Ralls notice and an opportunity to rebut the
evidence on which they had based their determinations.166 Ralls sued,
challenging the presidential order on due process grounds.167
The D.C. Circuit pointed to Mathews as the seminal case for
determining the “specific dictates of due process.”168 However, instead
of applying the Mathews factors one by one, the court referred to its

160. See supra Part I.B and accompanying text for a discussion of presidents’ broadening
IEEPA usage and the concomitant explosion of national emergency declarations.
161. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
162. Id. at 301–02.
163. Id. at 304–05.
164. Id. at 301.
165. Id. at 301–02.
166. Id. at 306.
167. Id. at 302.
168. Id. at 317 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1975)).
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precedent in non-IEEPA terrorist designation cases.169 The court
noted, as in the terrorist designation cases, “a substantial interest in
national security supports withholding only the classified information
but does not excuse the failure to provide notice of, and access to, the
unclassified information used to prohibit the transaction.”170 According
to the court, the presidential order deprived Ralls of due process by
failing to provide any of these procedural touchstones.171 In dicta, the
D.C. Circuit suggested adequate process during CFIUS review could
theoretically also satisfy the president’s due process obligations;
however, the chance “to submit written arguments, meet with CFIUS
officials in person, answer follow-up questions and receive advance
notice of the [government’s] intended action” will not suffice.172
Rather, the sanctioned party must receive “the opportunity to tailor its
submission to the [government’s] concerns or rebut the factual
premises underlying the President’s action.”173 Therefore, the
government must give its reasons, at least the unclassified ones.
2. “When”: Timing of Process. Despite tolerating postdeprivation
process alone in terrorism cases,174 courts have also required
predeprivation process in the foreign investment context. In addition
to exploring the basic contours of due process, the Ralls case addresses
when such process comes due. The court stated that the company
“must receive the procedural protections [the court has] spelled out
before the Presidential Order prohibits the transaction.”175 The court
169. See id. at 320 (“Under our [foreign terrorist organization] precedent, this lack of process
constitutes a clear constitutional violation, notwithstanding the [government’s] substantial
interest in national security and despite our uncertainty that more process would have led to a
different presidential decision.” (first citing People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of
State, 613 F.3d 220, 228 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam); and then citing Nat’l Council of Resistance
of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208–09 (D.C. Cir. 2001))). The terrorist designation
scheme referenced arises under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 302(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1248 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18, 21, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), which does not require a national emergency
declaration. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1). For a discussion of AEDPA and associated due process
concerns, see generally Justin S. Daniel, Comment, Blacklisting Foreign Terrorist Organizations:
Classified Information, National Security, and Due Process, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 213 (2017).
170. Ralls, 758 F.3d at 320 (citing Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran, 251 F.3d at 208–09).
171. Id. at 319–20.
172. Id. at 319.
173. Id. at 320 (first citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959); and then citing Nat’l
Council of Resistance of Iran, 251 F.3d at 205).
174. See supra Part II.A.2.
175. Ralls, 758 F.3d at 320 (emphasis added).
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held for Ralls because neither CFIUS nor the president had provided
adequate predeprivation process.176 The opinion does not mention
Calero-Toledo but instead relies on the D.C. Circuit’s non-IEEPA
terrorist designation cases.177 These other terrorism cases establish that
the government may not forego predeprivation process unless the
government demonstrates such timing would jeopardize national
security.178 So too with foreign investment.179 As the discussion in Part
II.A.2 illustrates, the government has repeatedly established such a
pressing need when it wields IEEPA to freeze terrorists’ assets, thereby
enabling the government to delay process in that setting. But, at least
in Ralls, the government failed to justify postponed process in the
foreign investment context.180
C. Data Security
When the president invokes IEEPA to ostracize foreign
technology companies, due process is owed to a similar extent but
likely comes due at an earlier time. The distinctive natures of the
national security threat and government response influence the process
due—both its extent and timing—under the Mathews and CaleroToledo tests. This Section applies these tests to data security,
comparing and contrasting data security to counterterrorist financing
and foreign investment. This Section argues that data security likely
parallels foreign investment more closely than it does counterterrorist
financing. As in the counterterrorism and foreign investment contexts,
the government must at least provide its reasons for blacklisting the
targeted entity based on the unclassified record, and it must offer the
targeted entity an opportunity to respond. However, unlike designated
terrorist organizations, technology companies blacklisted for data
security reasons, like foreign investors, are entitled to predeprivation
process.

176. Id. at 321; see supra Part II.B.1.
177. See Ralls, 758 F.3d at 318–20 (discussing precedents involving terrorist designations
under AEDPA and finding them “precisely on point”).
178. See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran, 251 F.3d at 208 (holding due process must be
provided “prior to the deprivation worked”); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of
State, 613 F.3d 220, 228 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[W]e have held due process requires that the [putative
foreign terrorist organization] be notified of the unclassified material on which the Secretary [of
State] proposes to rely and an opportunity to respond to that material before its
redesignation . . . .”).
179. Ralls, 758 F.3d at 320.
180. Id. at 321.
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1. “What”: Extent of Process. On a categorical level, companies
that allegedly pose informational threats to U.S. national security merit
due process protections that are co-extensive with those arising in the
contexts of counterterrorist financing and foreign investment. As
applied to data security, the Mathews test suggests that the government
must at least provide technology companies with its reasons for acting
based on the unclassified record.
The first Mathews factor—the affected private interest—cuts in
favor of significant due process. A presidential transaction ban
strangles the targeted corporation’s domestic business, much like an
OFAC asset freeze starves a designated entity. Expulsion from U.S.
markets could spell ruin for many technology companies. As Al
Haramain demonstrates, this existential private interest merits robust
procedural safeguards.181 Additionally, an IEEPA-authorized
transaction ban parallels a divestment order following CFIUS
review.182 As in Ralls, the targeted company is entitled to due process
to protect its “substantial property interests.”183
As to the second factor—the risk of erroneous deprivation—
errors grow more likely when the government makes the blacklisted
party guess at governmental concerns. Secret evidence further
obfuscates the government’s rationale and blinds the targeted
company. The company can neither alleviate the government’s
concerns when it does not know why the government has acted nor
correct factual errors without access to the government’s record.
Asymmetric information undermines the adversarial process assumed
by the Due Process Clause.184 Future courts will need to delineate how
much information makes notice adequate. Still, Al Haramain and Ralls
indicate that the government must provide more than a general
statement; rather, adequate notice requires specific reasons and
evidence.185 Hinting at data security will not fit the bill, and the
government will need to delineate why the targeted company’s data
collection and retention methods threaten national security. To
minimize the risk of erroneous deprivation, the government must at

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part II.B.
Ralls, 758 F.3d at 321.
See supra notes 125–133 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1.
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least share its reasons, unless doing so would undermine national
security.
The third Mathews factor—the governmental interest and burden
of providing additional procedural safeguards—will depend on the
government’s ability and willingness to articulate why more robust
procedures would jeopardize national security. Securing U.S. user data
supplies a compelling governmental interest, and courts defer to the
political branches on such matters of national security policy.186
Nevertheless, Al Haramain and Ralls confirm that the government
cannot merely wave national security as a talisman and ward off due
process challenges.187 The government must make its case, which will
vary with context. Sometimes national security will require procedural
shortcuts, but only when the government has explained why such
shortcuts are necessary to safeguard U.S. blood, treasure, and data.
In the context of data security, the government must explain why
providing a blacklisted technology company with additional
information would expose sensitive U.S. user data or otherwise harm
national security interests. However, without access to the
government’s classified information, it is unclear whether the
government’s ability to justify cutting procedural corners categorically
differs between counterterrorist financing, foreign investment, and
data security. Despite their differences, the former two categories have
fallen under the same fundamental rule: the government must provide
financial actors with at least its reasons for acting based on the
unclassified record. Technology companies are entitled to this same
foundational process. However, due process diverges as to the timing
of these protections depending on the category at hand.
2. “When”: Timing of Process. When the president invokes
IEEPA to respond to a putative data security threat, the targeted entity
should receive predeprivation process. Under existing law, the
government must justify its failure to provide predeprivation notice.188
According to the Supreme Court, “It is by now well established
that . . . ‘[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural

186. See supra Part I.C.
187. See supra Parts II.A, II.B.
188. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679–80 (1974) (permitting
postponement of process only when the government has shown “extraordinary” circumstances
exist).
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protections as the particular situation demands.’”189 The distinct threat
of aggregated data and the nature of a prospective transaction ban
probably do not justify departing from the predeprivation default.
Applying Calero-Toledo’s test, the Due Process Clause more
likely requires predeprivation process for companies that collect data
as opposed to entities that fund terror, which receive only
postdeprivation process. Like combatting terrorism, data security
almost certainly qualifies as an “important governmental interest,”
satisfying the first Calero-Toledo requirement.190 After all, even the
Supreme Court acknowledges that “no governmental interest is more
compelling than the security of the Nation.”191 The third Calero-Toledo
requirement also poses no obstacle to postdeprivation process. The
president plainly qualifies as a “government official” acting under
statutory authority.192 But, the second requirement complicates the
analysis.
Under Calero-Toledo, the government may provide
postdeprivation process only if it has demonstrated “a special need for
very prompt action.”193 Courts have recognized such a need when
OFAC freezes assets of designated terrorists pursuant to IEEPA to
prevent asset flight.194 Any preblocking process would enable the
designated entity to hide, spend, or scramble the money, thereby
evading sanctions.195 However, this special need evaporates when the

189. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972)).
190. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 76 (D.D.C. 2002)
(citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678), aff’d, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
191. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981); see also Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 76–77
(describing “combating terrorism by cutting off its funding” as an “important government
interest”).
192. Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (citing Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678).
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 686 F.3d 965, 985 (9th
Cir. 2012) (“[T]he potential for ‘asset flight’ almost certainly justifies OFAC’s decision not to
provide notice before freezing the assets.”); Glob. Relief Found. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th
Cir. 2002) (determining a preseizure hearing was not constitutionally required as it “would allow
any enemy to spirit assets out of the United States”); Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Unidentified
FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 50 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding a designated entity was “not entitled
to pre-deprivation notice and a hearing”), aff’d on other grounds sub nom., Islamic Am. Relief
Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Holy Land, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 76–77
(“[P]rompt action by the Government was necessary to protect against the transfer of assets
subject to the blocking order.”).
195. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 194.
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president prospectively excommunicates a technology company to
protect personally identifiable information. Rather than tying down
assets in the United States, the government prohibits transactions with
a problematic company to expel it from the U.S. market. Asset flight is
not the fear but the policy. The government action would prove all the
more effective if predeprivation notice were to drive the data collecting
company more quickly away from vulnerable U.S. users. Thus, under
the Calero-Toledo test, the Due Process Clause demands
predeprivation notice when the executive subjects a technology
company to a transaction ban citing data security concerns.
The argument for predeprivation process suffers one primary
flaw—the IEEPA transaction ban only issues following a declared
national emergency. Perhaps these labeled exigencies provide an
“extraordinary circumstance” that excuses belated process, but the
government may not simply cry “national emergency” and skirt
constitutional rights. Not all emergencies are created equal.196 Due
process depends on the nature of the threat and the government
response.197 On its face, an executive order may rely on IEEPA when
prohibiting transactions with a company to control the flow of user
data. However, this presidential action de facto resembles a
presidential ban following CFIUS review.
Take Ralls for example. Upon CFIUS’s recommendation,
President Obama ordered a U.S. company owned by Chinese nationals
to divest from a windfarm project, citing espionage concerns.198 The
D.C. Circuit held the presidential order violated the Due Process
Clause because the government had not provided Ralls with notice or
the opportunity to respond beforehand.199
In comparison, President Trump’s TikTok August 6 order
prospectively blocked transactions with a U.S. company owned by a
Chinese company, indicating data security concerns.200 The executive
order covered “any transaction by any person, or with respect to any
property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” with
196. See, e.g., Selden, supra note 9, at 528 (arguing courts should balance “the degree of the
national emergency against the types of constitutional freedoms abridged”).
197. See supra notes 97–108 and accompanying text.
198. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 301–02, 304 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
199. Id. at 321.
200. Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 6, 2020); TikTok Complaint, supra
note 17, at 2–3, 6.
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TikTok.201 Citing IEEPA as the source of presidential authority, the
executive order articulated the threat:
TikTok automatically captures vast swaths of information from its
users, including internet and other network activity information such
as location data and browsing and search histories. This data
collection threatens to allow the Chinese Communist Party access to
Americans’ personal and proprietary information—potentially
allowing China to track the locations of Federal employees and
contractors, build dossiers of personal information for blackmail, and
conduct corporate espionage.202

With both Ralls and TikTok, the intended effect was the same: to
banish a U.S. company with Chinese ties to protect sensitive
information. Perhaps these concerns justify the presidents’ bans.
Perhaps not. Regardless, the functional equivalence of the bans
suggests that the Due Process Clause requires prior notice and the
opportunity to respond in both situations, even when IEEPA is
nominally invoked as an alternative to the CFIUS process.203
Taken together, the existing cases under IEEPA and other dealcancelling frameworks suggest that the president must offer due
process before outlawing transactions with companies that allegedly
threaten data security. Postdeprivation process is permissible to enable
OFAC to wage war on terrorists’ wallets.204 Predeprivation process is
required when ordering foreign companies to divest from U.S. ventures
due to espionage concerns.205 In the counterterrorism context, the
government wishes to secure the money to keep terrorists away from
U.S. individuals. In the divestment order context, the government
wishes to keep foreign money away to secure U.S. information. Data
security more closely resembles this second setting, so it likely calls for
similar procedural safeguards—predeprivation process in particular.
As such, the Due Process Clause significantly protects entities targeted
under IEEPA for informational threats. It buys them time and chances
to state their cases. However, procedural rights do not assure
substantive victory.

201. Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. at 48,637–38.
202. Id.
203. See Allman, supra note 7, at 312 (arguing Ralls provides a “compelling due process
argument” against an IEEPA ban having the same effect).
204. See supra Part II.A.2.
205. See supra Part II.B.2.
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III. LIMITS OF DUE PROCESS
The bundle of due process rights forms a humble raft, by which
some technology companies might hope to remain afloat, but the vessel
leaks from both ends. At the threshold, some foreign companies lack
due process rights altogether. At the back end, remedies remain
restricted. This Part addresses both limitations in turn.
A. Front-end Limitations: Availability of Due Process
Procedural due process rights protect many, but not all,
technology companies subject to executive emergency powers.
Corporations and individuals alike are entitled to due process when the
government deprives them of life, liberty, or property.206 However, due
process rights do not extend to all; rather, foreign entities must
establish “substantial connections” with the United States to secure
due process protections.207 Some due process challenges to IEEPAauthorized actions have faltered at this threshold.208
In applying the “substantial connections” test, the D.C. Circuit
seemingly requires some degree of physical presence in the United
States.209 For instance, in one case, the D.C. Circuit held two Iranian

206. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 24 S. Ct. 436, 444 (1904) (“Corporations are persons
within the meaning of the constitutional provision forbidding the deprivation of property without
due process of law . . . .”).
207. The Court has stated that “aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come
within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country.”
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264–66, 271 (1990) (suggesting Fourth
Amendment rights inure to the benefit of only those with “substantial connections” with the
United States). The “substantial connections” test has also been applied to the Fifth Amendment.
See Jifry v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 370 F.3d 1174, 1182–83 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting, to receive
Fifth Amendment protections, aliens must have “substantial connections” to the United States
(quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271)).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1347 (M.D. Fla. 2004)
(determining an entity lacked due process rights because it had “no substantial connection to the
United States”); Fulmen Co. v. Off. of Foreign Assets Control, No. 1:18-cv-02949, 2020 WL
1536341, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2020) (“Because Fulmen’s own pleadings demonstrate no
property or presence in the United States, it cannot establish the ‘substantial connections’
necessary to potentially entitle it to constitutional protections as a non-resident alien.”).
209. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (“A foreign entity without property or presence in the United States has no constitutional
rights, under the Due Process Clause or otherwise.”); see also FBME Bank Ltd. v. Lew, 209 F.
Supp. 3d 299, 327–28 (D.D.C. 2016) (noting the substantial connections test “suggests at least
some degree of physical presence”); Rakhimov v. Gacki, No. 1:19-cv-02554, 2020 WL 1911561, at
*5 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2020) (concluding the plaintiff could not bring a Fifth Amendment challenge

ELLISON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

532

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/22/2021 10:05 AM

[Vol. 71:499

organizations were entitled to due process because they had alleged
substantial connections in the form of a U.S. office space and bank
account.210 Yet, in another instance, a post office box and U.S. bank
account did not suffice.211 The difference—the physical office—
suggests possessing property in the United States brings an entity
within the ambit of the Due Process Clause.212
Many companies that gather personally identifiable information
hold property within the United States, thereby exhibiting the
necessary connections to avail themselves of due process. Many
technology companies have based their U.S. operations out of U.S.
offices.213 Consider TikTok. TikTok’s principal place of business is in
California.214 Many of TikTok’s key personnel, including its interim
CEO and General Counsel, work from the United States.215 In fact,
TikTok, incorporated in the United States, is not even a foreign
entity.216 Because TikTok has literally rooted itself in the United States,
it may avail itself of U.S. constitutional rights. More broadly, as
technology companies set up shop in the United States, they come
closer to U.S. consumers, data, and constitutional rights.
However, other data-gathering technology companies may not
exert such a robust U.S. presence particularly because the digital
economy transcends geographic boundaries. Many data-producing
where the plaintiff failed to allege physical presence), dismissing appeal No. 20-5121, 2020 WL
4107145 (D.C. Cir. July 1, 2020).
210. Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 201–02 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
211. 32 Cnty. Sovereignty Comm. v. Dep’t of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
212. See Kadi v. Geithner, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2012) (“Taken together, then, these
cases at least imply that a foreign national with property in the United States has a sufficient
connection to the United States to raise at least some constitutional claims.”).
213. The United States is home to “far more [large tech companies] than any other country.”
Jonathan Ponciano, The World’s Largest Technology Companies in 2021: Apple’s Lead Widens as
Coinbase, DoorDash Storm into Ranks, FORBES (May 13, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanponciano/2021/05/13/worlds-largest-tech-companies-2021/ [https:/
/perma.cc/E8XT-P7HM]; see also François Candelon, Martin Reeves & Daniel Wu, 18 of the Top
20 Tech Companies Are in the Western U.S. and Eastern China. Can Anywhere Else Catch Up?,
HARV. BUS. REV. (May 3, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/05/18-of-the-top-20-tech-companies-are-inthe-western-u-s-and-eastern-china-can-anywhere-else-catch-up [https://perma.cc/634H-Q67H]
(“Today’s digital world is organized around two centers of gravity: the U.S. West Coast and the
east coast of China. . . . The leading companies in online search, social media, and e-commerce
are all based in one or the other of these two regions.”).
214. TikTok Complaint, supra note 17, at 6.
215. Id. at 14.
216. Id. at 6, 8.
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transactions transpire on the internet rather than U.S. soil. As the
digital economy develops, operations may completely untether from
the physical market that businesses, and particularly technology
companies, wish to reach.217 In fact, many technology companies are
“born global,” meaning they can connect “with international
customers, suppliers, capital, and mentors from day one.”218 As a result,
many foreign entities serving U.S. consumers do not maintain any
physical presence in the United States. While integrating the global
economy, this unbundling could increase the number of companies
serving U.S. consumers without carrying on such a U.S. presence so as
to entitle these companies to due process rights.
As the information age advances, the law may reimagine
“substantial connections” to transcend physical presence. If virtual
presence were to suffice, many companies would pass through the
“substantial connections” filter, especially those that pose
informational threats to national security. After all, these technology
companies gather data by virtually interacting with U.S. users. Some
companies, like TikTok, bolster their virtual presence with a physical
presence by storing U.S. user data on servers in the United States.219
Such behavior strengthens a company’s ties to the United States and
claim to due process rights. Whether the law will come to redefine
“substantial connections” in the digital age remains an open question.
Regardless, under existing law and economic trends, many datagathering entities pass the “substantial connections” test. Assuming
they do, and assuming they prevail on the merits, these entities still may
win only restricted relief.

217. McKinsey & Company has observed, “[Companies] that deliver digital goods and
services can enter new international markets without establishing a physical presence at all.”
JAMES MANYIKA, SUSAN LUND, JACQUES BUGHIN, JONATHAN WOETZEL, KALIN STAMENOV
& DHRUV DHINGRA, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., DIGITAL GLOBALIZATION: THE NEW ERA OF
GLOBAL FLOWS 15 (2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/
McKinsey%20Digital/Our%20Insights/Digital%20globalization%20The%20new%20era%20of%
20global%20flows/MGI-Digital-globalization-Full-report.ashx [https://perma.cc/U6J5-AB5Z].
218. Id. at 46.
219. TikTok Complaint, supra note 17, at 10–11.
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B. Back-end Limitations: Procedural Remedies
Procedural rights offer only procedural remedies. National
security’s high stakes counsel judicial restraint.220 In both
counterterrorist financing and foreign investment cases, courts hesitate
to vacate executive branch decisions to avoid speculating as to how
affording due process might affect the determination; instead, courts
remand with procedural instructions.221 Furthermore, classified
evidence limits procedural redress because many blacklisted entities
will never see the classified information used against them.222 Data
security cases share these limits just as presidential tech-targeting
transaction bans share common statutory and functional settings with
OFAC asset freezes and post-CFIUS divestment orders, respectively.
So, even when presidents invoke data security—rather than
terrorism—as the basis for their orders, and even when presidents
strive to cause—rather than avoid—asset flight, courts choose from a
limited menu of remedies in deference to the executive’s national
security policy judgments.
Nevertheless, even these limited procedural remedies carry
significant value to technology companies sitting on troves of U.S. data
because timing is everything. Like companies subject to post-CFIUS
divestment orders, technology companies subject to IEEPAauthorized executive orders are entitled to due process before the
deprivation has occurred, that is before the company is expelled from
U.S. markets.223 So, not only does the Due Process Clause give such
companies a chance to contest the government’s decision, but the
clause also gives them the gift of time: time to argue and time to stall—
perhaps even long enough to endure until a new administration with
different enforcement priorities takes control. TikTok, for instance,
illustrates the ticking clock. President Trump issued the executive

220. See, e.g., Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 209
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (remanding without vacating because of “the realities of the foreign policy and
national security concerns”).
221. See KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 710 F. Supp. 2d 637,
658 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (“[T]he proper remedy for a notice violation in the context of designation
proceedings is to remand to OFAC, without vacatur . . . , with instructions as to what additional
notice is required.”); Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 320–21 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (preserving a presidential order to divest despite its violating company’s procedural
due process rights).
222. See supra notes 125–133 and accompanying text.
223. See supra Part II.C.2.
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order to prospectively excommunicate TikTok on August 6, 2020.224
TikTok fought the ban in court.225 By February 2021, the Biden
administration paused the litigation and permitted TikTok to operate
unscathed as the new president pondered his predecessor’s policy,
thereby allowing TikTok to evade a fire sale to Oracle and Walmart.226
At the end of the day, the company may not change the government’s
mind even when given the process due. But due process makes that day
much longer.
In sum, the Due Process Clause significantly protects many datagathering technology companies that fall prey to the president’s
emergency economic powers. Due process does so notwithstanding the
front-end limits on procedural rights’ availability to foreign entities and
the back-end limits on procedural remedies. The predeprivation
process available to such companies promises time, making due
process particularly valuable in the data security setting.
But due process is no panacea. It safeguards constitutional rights
but not constitutional structure. Specifically, the Due Process Clause
alone will not control the president’s vast emergency powers and
preserve the balance of power within the federal government because
“only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its
fingers.”227
IV. AMENDING IEEPA
Congress should amend IEEPA to restore the balance of power
between the branches of the federal government. Any amendment
must reckon with the unpredictability of future emergencies and the
practical reasons motivating Congress to delegate emergency powers
to the president in the first place.228 Acknowledging this uncertainty,
many commentators have clamored for a sunset provision, under which

224. Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637, 48,637–38 (Aug. 6, 2020).
225. TikTok Complaint, supra note 17, at 4–5.
226. John D. McKinnon & Alex Leary, TikTok Sale to Oracle, Walmart Is Shelved as Biden
Reviews Security, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2021, 5:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-sale-tooracle-walmart-is-shelved-as-biden-reviews-security-11612958401 [https://perma.cc/38WA-XR9K].
227. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
228. As Alexander Hamilton wrote, “[I]t is impossible to foresee or define the extent and
variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may
be necessary to satisfy them.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
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presidentially declared emergencies would automatically terminate
unless extended by Congress.229 This Note endorses this reform.
Congress should amend IEEPA so that presidentially declared
emergencies sunset unless Congress extends them through a fast-track
review process. This Part begins by revisiting the need for IEEPA
reform and details the suggested amendment. Next, it considers
potential objections and concludes that IEEPA reform would dovetail
with due process and sustain constitutional structure.
As discussed in Part I.A, IEEPA provides little supervision as it is
currently used. IEEPA confers broad emergency powers on the
president, including the power to declare when such powers are
activated.230 The president may easily renew declared emergencies by
notifying Congress and publishing renewals in the Federal Register.231
Originally, NEA and IEEPA relied on a legislative veto to check
presidential power, providing that Congress could terminate a declared
emergency by concurrent resolution.232 In striking down legislative
vetoes, the Supreme Court eliminated this safeguard, so now Congress
must amass a veto-proof supermajority to terminate a national
emergency over presidential opposition.233 Even if Congress were to
work this miracle, the president could still unilaterally proclaim a new
emergency.234 Today, Congress cannot second guess presidents’
emergency declarations, permitting presidents to make their own laws,

229. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 51, at 1047, 1060–61 (proposing amendment so that
emergencies would terminate after two or three months, requiring renewal by escalating
congressional supermajorities); Carter, supra note 55, at 1259–60 (advocating a sunset provision
to “stimulate a greater discussion of the issues and [to] require Congress to take a position”); Koh,
supra note 60, at 1321 n.314 (suggesting emergency orders automatically expire unless extended
by Congress through fast-track approval mechanisms); Jason Luong, Note, Forcing Constraint:
The Case for Amending the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1181,
1211–12 (2000) (suggesting a sunset provision); Peter Harrell, The Right Way To Reform the U.S.
President’s International Emergency Powers, JUST SEC. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://
www.justsecurity.org/69388/the-right-way-to-reform-the-u-s-presidents-international-emergency-powers
[https://perma.cc/58UE-DTE4] (advocating for amending IEEPA to require congressional
approval to extend emergencies beyond six months or a year).
230. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a)–(b) (allowing the president to trigger emergency powers by
declaring a national emergency).
231. See id. § 1622(d) (requiring the president to renew declared national emergencies each
year by publishing a renewal in the Federal Register and transmitting notice to Congress).
232. CASEY ET AL., supra note 4, at 46.
233. Id. For a deeper discussion of legislative vetoes and IEEPA, see supra notes 49–52 and
accompanying text.
234. Ackerman, supra note 51, at 1080–81.
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at least during nominal emergencies. Congress has de facto abdicated
its power to check presidents when they wield IEEPA.
To reclaim its supervisory role, Congress should amend NEA and
IEEPA to include a sunset provision, as suggested by numerous
commentators.235 With a sunset provision, a national emergency would
automatically terminate after a specified period unless Congress were
to vote affirmatively to extend the emergency. Under the amended
framework, a presidential emergency declaration would trigger a fasttrack process for Congress to extend the declared emergency.236 Unlike
IEEPA’s existing reporting requirements, this amendment would force
Congress to consider the policy merits of declared emergencies,
holding both Congress and the president politically accountable.
This amendment might stoke fears that congressional gridlock will
doom some so-called “national emergencies.” Legislators might seek
to leverage emergency renewal votes to achieve unrelated political
ends. This amendment might replace executive initiative with
congressional stalemate. However, numerous factors assuage these
concerns. First, fast-track provisions would expedite the legislative
process and minimize procedural saber-rattling. For instance, such
procedures could prohibit certain amendments or motions and include
privileged access to the Senate and House floors.237 Congress has
already employed similar fast-track provisions to review the use of
military force under the War Powers Act.238 Second, the president
would remain free to respond to a crisis before the emergency sunsets,
perhaps after a few months. Instead of cabining the president,239 this
amendment would help keep emergencies “rare and brief” as
envisioned by IEEPA’s drafters, comporting with the intuition that
true emergencies are immediate crises rather than extended

235. See sources cited supra note 229.
236. For instance, Professor Harold Koh has similarly suggested that IEEPA reform could
deploy a fast-track process “to ensure express congressional approval or disapproval of the
President’s emergency actions before the emergency expired.” Koh, supra note 60, at 1321 n.314.
237. CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20234, EXPEDITED OR “FASTTRACK” LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES 1 (2015).
238. Id.
239. See Luong, supra note 229, at 1212 (“[A sunset provision] would not compromise the
president’s functional superiority in responding to external threats while still adhering to
Congress’s primary legislative authority, including its express power to regulate foreign
commerce.”).
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conflicts.240 Congressional approval, not executive fiat, better indicates
whether a national emergency ought to extend beyond the immediate
crisis. Third, the president may continue to utilize other tools, such as
the CFIUS framework, to block transactions that threaten U.S.
security. Whatever risk of legislative gamesmanship remains
unmitigated is but a small price to pay for the protection of U.S.
institutions and rights.
The proposed structural safeguards would harmonize with the
existing due process jurisprudence. Procedural due process rights
protect private interests, but congressional oversight supplements
these safeguards by more generally protecting individual rights from
executive overreach.241 But not all statutory reforms equally accord
with due process. Unlike a procedural checklist mandated by statute,
the ex post congressional oversight proposed in this Part better accords
with the flexible due process jurisprudence. Under existing law, the
rigor of due process depends on the situation, giving legal effect to a
gut sense that different emergencies beget different responses.
Congress should not dress this practical instinct in a procedural
straitjacket, which would command procedures too robust in some
circumstances and too weak in others given IEEPA’s wide-ranging
uses. Furthermore, statutory safeguards would almost certainly not
solve the prickly problem of secret evidence. Instead of freezing due
process by statutorily defining it, Congress should restore political
process.
A sunset provision paired with fast-track approval would help
Congress claw back its role in checking executive power. Like the Due
Process Clause, these political checks would protect individuals and
enterprises, but they would also limit potential executive abuse of
emergency powers. In doing so, this approach would neither prevent
the president from responding to immediate threats nor reduce due
process to a rigid checklist. From combatting terrorism to protecting
sensitive user data, the United States must respond to a broad array of
threats. Accordingly, the statute should allow for short-term executive
discretion subject to meaningful review by both courts and Congress.
240. H.R. REP. NO. 95-459, at 10 (1977) (“[E]mergencies are by their nature rare and brief,
and are not equated with normal, ongoing problems. . . . A state of national emergency should
not be a normal state of affairs.”).
241. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Burton, J.,
concurring) (“With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique
for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law
be made by parliamentary deliberations.”).
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CONCLUSION
Procedural due process shields many technology companies
targeted for their troves of U.S. user data. The precise contours of this
shield have yet to be measured in judicial opinions and scholarship.
This Note extrapolates due process’s dimensions from the examples of
counterterrorist financing and foreign investment. When the president
uses IEEPA to expel data-collecting companies from the U.S.
economy, the government must provide meaningful notice and an
opportunity to respond before a presidential transaction ban takes
effect. This notice must at least include the government’s unclassified
reasons for acting. However, due process cannot cure all. Companies
without substantial ties to the United States lack due process rights
altogether, and procedural rights beget only procedural remedies.
Even so, predeprivation process affords many private actors the gift of
time, safeguarding constitutional rights.
As for constitutional structure, due process alone will not buoy the
interbranch balance of power in the face of unchecked emergency
executive power. Congress should add a sunset provision to IEEPA, as
many scholars have suggested. Congressional oversight of emergency
declarations would supplement individual procedural rights with a
structural check on executive overreach.
By ensuring due process and reviewing emergency declarations,
the courts and Congress must engage to manage otherwise unfettered
presidential power. From counterterrorist financing and foreign
investment to data security, due process and political process must
work in tandem to protect both constitutional rights and structures.
Only then should we trust the process.

